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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the issues of economic development and conducts a
welfare analysis of economic policies for development. Large variations in
economic growth rates have drawn the attention of many economists (e.g.
Lucas 1988). Easterly (1994) and Quah (1996, 1997) have extracted the po-
larization of growth rates from this diversity. Furthermore, Princhett (1997)
has reported that the divergence of economies can be observed in longer time
spans (around two hundred years). Princhett's study noted that growth in
developed countries has been constant in the long run, whereas the economies
of the world's underdeveloped nations are caught in poverty traps regardless
of the large amounts of domestic and international policy expenditure to
foster economic development.
In this growth process, we can identify one property, i.e., the implications
of regime switch on economic development. Some empirical studies show the
change of growth engine on the processes of economic growth. Abramovitz
and David (1973) demonstrated that in the early nineteenth century, Amer-
ica's economic growth was more heavily dependent on capital accumulation
than on total factor productivity (TFP). Hayami and Ogasawara (1999) re-
ported similar results from Japanese pre-war data. These works show that
relatively developed economies grow as a result of capital accumulation at
the early stage of development; later, these countries change their growth
regime to one that is driven by research and development (R&D) activities.
Since capital has a decreasing returns property and R&D activities perpet-
ually increase the TFP, this regime change appears to be a critical event for
long-run economic growth. The purpose of this study is to analyze the me-
chanics of the phenomena described above. Regime change and the realiza-
tion of long-run growth have been receiving attention in this decade because
of their connection with the endogenous growth theory. Some theoretical
works, e.g., Zilibotti (1995), Matsuyama (1999), Funke and Strulik (2000),
Galor and Moav (2004), Irmen (2005), and Kuwahara (2007), have devel-
oped models to describe the regime change from capital-based growth with
decreasing returns to long-run positive growth. In particular, the present
study has a similar aim, shared by Iremen (1995) and Kuwahara (2007),
which concerns the analysis of regime swich from capital-based growth to
R&D-based growth. In particular, the present study is consistent with those
of Irmen (2005) and Kuwahara (2007) in terms of focusing on the regime
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switch of economic growth from capital-based to R&D-based growth. While
Irmen (2005) conducted the analysis using the model of competitive economy
and Kuwahara (2007) develops a model with instantaneous monopoly power,
this study constructs a model with permanently e®ective patent, therefore
initertemporal e®ects of patent is analyzed.
By using an R&D-based growth model with capital as an input for R&D
production, the present study aims to derive the cause of these phenomena
of polarizing economies and regime change and to identify the theoretical
condition for imoplementing e®ective policies for economic development. As
is widely recognized among economists, the main source of economic growth
is TFP and not capital accumulation. Economic growth endogenously de-
riven by TFP has been incorporated into the ¯rst generation R&D-based
growth models (e.g., Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991, and Aghion
and Howitt 1992). These models assume that (exogenously endowed) human
resources are used in R&D activities and that the long-run growth rate and
R&D inputs are related, often concluding that the introduction of capital
would not alter the essential results (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991 Ch.5
and Aghion and Howitt 1998 Ch.3). However, some studies have qualitatively
related capital accumulation to R&D activities. For example, Abramovitz
and David (1973) demonstrated that R&D activities positively depends on
the level of capital accumulation, and Chandler (1990) demonstrated that
the scale expansion of enterprises generates R&D activities and product di-
versi¯cation. Because an extent of economic development or a scale of ¯rms
can be interpreted as being re°ected by capital accumulation, these studies
imply the existence of a relationship between capital accumulation and R&D
activities.
We utilize the model presented by Romer (1990). The main modi¯cation
we make is that capital is used in R&D activities. This slight transformation
of the assumption yields several remarkable results regarding the mecha-
nism that engenders the polarization of economies and the implementation
of e®ective economic policies for escaping poverty traps. First, the R&D-
based growth model emphasizes the relationship between growth rates and
R&D input endowment. In the ¯rst generation models of the R&D-based
growth, the endowment of human resources, which are used in R&D activi-
ties and endowed exogenously, determine the economic growth rate. On the
other hand, our assumption of capital R&D input relates the amount of the
capital to economic growth rate. Furthermore, because the capital stock is
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determined endogenously, our model provides the mechanism by which the
long-run growth pattern is determined by the endogenously- determined en-
dowment of R&D input factors. Therefore, our study delves further into the
analysis of the causes of poverty traps. Moreover, our model relates the deep
parameters of the model to long term growth rate through determining the
equilibrium capital stock in the steady state. It indicates that lower costs
of intermediate goods and higher R&D productivity are necessary to achieve
positive long-run growth.
Second, we also derive some implications pertaining to the role of domestic
and international policy in economic development. We identify the optimal
growth path and examine economic welfare. Distortion of the intermediate
goods sector causes the equilibrium capital stock to be excessively small.
The GDP growth rate of the present model is positively related with capi-
tal. Therefore, a smaller capital stock engenders a lower GDP growth rate.
The capital stock is stimulated by interest rate subsidies. Consequently, the
steady-state growth rate is raised and optimal growth is realized. This opti-
mal policy can enhance economic welfare, but it is unable to set the economy
on a long-run growth path if the optimal path of an economy is a steady state
with no growth. This result can easily be corresponded to the policy implica-
tion for o±cial development assistance (ODA). Many studies, e.g., Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) and Fischer (1993), conclude that economic growth in
developing countires depends on their own economics policies. Boone (1996)
insists that foreign aid has not raised the growth rates in poor countries,
whereas Burnside and Doller (2000) report that the e®ectiveness of an aid
policy is conditional. Our results show that sound institutions are essential
for economic growth, consistent withstudies such as Hall and Jone (1999);
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001a, 2001b); and Dollar and Kraay
(2003). Thus, empirical results can be theoretically obtained in the present
study.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is established and the con-
ditions of a decentralized economy are derived in Section 2. The existence of
the two types of steady states and their determinants are presented in Sec-
tion 3. The dynamic property of the model is analyzed in Section 4, and a
welfare analysis is presented in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section
6.
4
2 The Model
This study adopts a Romer-type (1990) production structure. Three sectors
are considered in the present analysis: the ¯nal goods, intermediate goods,
and R&D sectors. Three factors are used: labor, capital, and knowledge.
Final goods are consumed as consumption goods or are invested as physical
capital. They are produced with labor (L), capital employed in the ¯nal
goods sector (KY ), and a cluster of intermediate goods.
1 In this study, labor
is employed only in the ¯nal goods sector, and capital can be used for ¯nal
goods production (KY ) and investment to create new varieties of intermedi-
ate goods, namely R&D activities (KA). The market-clearing condition for
capital imposes K = KY + KA, where K is the total amount of capital in
the economy. The production function of ¯nal goods is speci¯ed as
Y = L1¡®
Z A
0
x(i)®di; 0 < ® < 1; (1)
where Y; L;A, and x(i) indicate the ¯nal goods product, labor, the number of
varieties, and i's intermediate goods inputs, respectively. Intermediate goods
are produced using physical capital and are used in the ¯nal goods production
process. One unit of intermediate goods is assumed to be produced by ´
units of capital. Therefore capital devoted to ¯nal goods production KY is
quanti¯ed as
KY ´
Z A
0
´x(i)di: (2)
An assumption of symmetric equilibrium regarding intermediate goods, that
is x = x(i), converts Eq. (2) intoKY = ´Ax or equivalently x = (1=´)(KY =A).
Substituting x(i) = x = (1=´)(KY =A) into Eq. (1) allows the following
derivation:
Y = ´¡®L1¡®A1¡®K®Y : (3)
Because of the assumption that ¯nal goods Y are consumed or invested and
Eq. (3), the following resource constraint of ¯nal goods holds:
_K = ´¡®L1¡®A1¡®K®Y ¡ C(= Y ¡ C); (4)
where _K and C denote the increment of aggregate capital K and aggregate
consumption, respectively.
1The scale of the cluster, that is, the variety of intermediate goods (A), can be regarded
as technological stock in this economy.
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The ¯nal goods sector is competitive, Eq. (1) yields the ¯rst order con-
ditions (FOCs) of ¯nal goods production that are given as @Y
@L
= w, and
@Y
@x(i)
= p(i), where w and p(i) denote the real wage and the price of ith
sector intermediate goods, respectively.
The designs of intermediate goods are protected by patents. Therefore,
intermediate goods are supplied monopolistically. In addition, a ¯rm with
a patent for ith intermediate goods production can be designated as a ith
intermediate goods ¯rm. As stated earlier, it is assumed that one unit of
intermediate goods is produced using ´ units of capital. The pro¯t of the
ith intermediate goods sector is given as ¼(i) ´ p(i)x(i) ¡ r´x(i), where r
is the rental price of capital and ¼(i) is the pro¯t of the ith intermediate
goods ¯rm. The intermediate goods ¯rm maximizes this pro¯t subject to
@Y
@x(i)
= p(i). This optimization yields the following:
x(i) = x =
µ
®2
r´
¶ 1
1¡®
L; p(i) = p =
³ ´
®
´
r:
From Eqs. (1) and (2) and the FOCs, the market prices are obtained as
w = (1¡ ®)Y
L
; r = ®2
Y
KY
; and ¼ = ¼(i) = ®(1¡ ®)Y
A
: (5)
Innovation is assumed to be the discovery of a new design of intermediate
goods that are added to the existing set of intermediate goods; therefore, the
increment of new variety is the time di®erentiation of knowledge _A. In the
process of innovation, since it is assumed that the input is capital, the ¯rms
undertake R&D by paying the rental cost r. R&D ¯rms create the designs
of new intermediate goods, and the patents of these designs bear the stream
of monopoly pro¯ts ¼. The present value of this stream represents the value
of R&D:
vt ´
Z 1
t
¼(¿)e¡
R ¿
t r(s)dsd¿:
Thus, aggregate revenue and cost of R&D are given as v _A and rKA, respec-
tively.
Free entry of R&D is assumed; thus, if the pro¯ts from R&D are larger
than the costs, then an in¯nite amount of capital would be allocated to R&D
activities; this cannot hold in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the pro¯t
of R&D is less than its cost, then investment in R&D is unpro¯table; thus,
no resource is allocated to R&D, and an equilibrium without R&D (KA =
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0) occurs. Thus, when the economy is in equilibrium with positive R&D
activities, then the revenue of R&D must be equated to the cost of R&D.
Thus, the relationships between market equilibrium and capital allocation
are summarized as
Solow Regime: KA = 0
Romer Regime: KA > 0
Not in equilibrium
9>=>;() rKA
8><>:
>
=
<
9>=>; v _A; (6)
Whether or not the economy conducts R&D depends on condition (6). When
KA > 0, R&D activities take place; this causes the economy to grow through
endogenous tchnological change. Following Matsuyama (1999), we term this
regime as the Romer regime. Condition (6) states that the equality holds in
Romer regime. When KA = 0, no R&D activity is operated, and therefore,
the economy grows by only capital accumulation. Following Matsuyama
(1999), we term this regime as the Solow regime. In the Romer regime, the
system obey the equaltion in (6).
Following each regime, di®erentiating v with respect to time provides the
following asset equations:
Solow Regime: KA = 0
Romer Regime: KA > 0
)
() rv
(
>
=
)
¼ + _v (7)
If R&D is undertaken, technological knowledge is assumed to increase
according to
_A =
±KA
L
= ±(k ¡ kY ); (8)
where k and kY respectively denote the per capita value of K and KY (more
generally z denotes the per capita value of a aggregate variable Z). In other
words, the increment of knowledge depends on the capital investment devoted
to R&D activities positively and population scale negatively. Furthermore,
the both factors linearly a®ect the increament.
We examine the consumption decision to close the model. It is assumed
that a representative household maximizes the additively separable utility
function subject to a budget constraint:
Ut =
Z 1
t
c(¿)1¡¾ ¡ 1
1¡ ¾ e
¡½(¿¡t)d¿; ¾ > 0; (9)
subject to
_k = rk + w ¡ c¡ nk; (10)
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where ½, ¾, and n denote the subjective discount rate, constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), and population growth rate, respectively. We assume that
the population growth rate is exogenously constant. An optimal condition
regarding consumption is the Keynes-Ramsey rule,
¾
_c
c
= r ¡ ½¡ n; (11)
and the transversality condition
lim
t!1
e¡½t¸(t)k(t) = 0; (12)
where ¸(´ c¡¾) is the shadow price of capital stock K.
3 Steady States
Next, we analyze the economy in a steady state; here, all variables, Y;C;K;KY
and A, grow at constant rates (possibly zero). Our model contains two types
of steady states. One is a steady state with R&D, therefore, positive growth,
and the other is one with no R&D, therefore no growth. We term these steady
stetes as the Romer Steady States (RSS) and the Solow Steady States (SSS),
respectively.
Di®erentiating Y in Eq. (1) with respect to time yields gY = (1¡®)(gA+
n) + ®gK , where gZ is the growth rate of variable Z i.e., gZ ´ _Z=Z. Eq. (4)
implies that gY = gK = gC in a steady state. These two conditions produce
the following relation in a steady state:
gssY = g
ss
K = g
ss
C = g
ss
A + n; (13)
where ss represents the value of steady states.
It is sometimes convenient to consider the variables of a constant in a
steady state. Therefore, we de¯ne the knowledge-adjusted per capita value
of a variable Z as ~z
¡´ Z=(AL)¢. Applying this notation on Y , r, ¼ and gA,
we obtain the following:
~Y = ´¡® ~K®Y ; r = ®
2´¡® ~K®¡1Y ; ¼ = (1¡ ®)®´¡® ~K®Y ; and gA = ±( ~K ¡ ~KY ):
(14)
Substituting gssc = g
ss
A into the Keynes-Ramsey rule of Eq. (11), we obtain
steady state equations:
¾gssA = r
ss ¡ ½¡ n: (15)
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¼(i) derived in Eq. (5) and the de¯nition of v imply gssv = g
ss
¼ = g
ss
Y ¡ gssA .
Combining this and Eq. (13) yields gss¼ = 0. Substituting ¼ derived from Eq.
(5), r derived from (15), gA derivbed in Eq. (14), and g
ss
v = 0 into (7), we
obtain the following condition for R&D:
Romer Steady States (RSS):
Solow Steady States (SSS):
)
()
½+ n+ ¾±(~kss ¡ ~kssY ) = ®2´¡®~kss ®¡1Y
(
=
>
)
±
1¡ ®
®
~kssY + n; (16)
3.1 The property of the Romer Steady State (RSS)
In RSS, the equaliy in Eq. (16) holds and it determines the equilibrium
capital allocation in the steady state between ¯nal goods production and
R&D activities. From the second and third terms in Eq. (16), we obtain the
equilibrium capital allocation to ¯nal goods production in RSS ~K¤Y as
~k¤Y ´ arg
½
~kssY
¯¯¯¯
®2´¡®~kss ®¡1Y = ±
1¡ ®
®
~kssY ¡ n;
¾
(17)
Hereafter, we denote the value in RSS by indexing ¤.
From the ¯rst and third terms of Eq. (16), we can obtain the relationship
between steady state knowledge-adjusted capital stock ~k¤ and the steady
state knowledge-adjusted capital stock devoted to ¯nal goods ~k¤Y :
~k¤ =
1
¾
½µ
¾ +
1
®
¡ 1
¶
~k¤Y ¡
½
±
¾
; or ~k¤Y =
½+ ¾±~k¤¡
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1¢ ± : (18)
Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (14), we obtain the growth rate of the econ-
omy in RSS as2
g¤ =
1
¾
µ
±
1¡ ®
®
~k¤Y ¡ ½
¶
=
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢ ±~k¤ ¡ ½
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1
Ã
=
±~k¤ ¡ ®
1¡®½
®
1¡®¾ + 1
!
: (19)
2It is noteworthy that this growth rate closely resembles that of Eq. (13) in Romer
(1990). Both equations commonly share the following properties: a higher R&D e±ciency
± and increased of R&D input (knowledge-adjusted capital stock ~k in the present study, and
a higher human capital amount in Romer 1990); further, smaller values of the subjective
discount rate ½ and CRRA parameter ¾ raises the economic growth rate. One di®erence
between the two is as follows. We have set R&D input as capital, which is endogenously
accumulated. Therefore, we can endogenously derive the R&D input factor in this study.
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Eq. (19) implies that small ¾, ½ and ´ result in a faster growth rate in RSS.
From (19), the condition of positive growth is given as
~k¤ >
½®
±(1¡ ®)
¡´ ~k¢: (20)
This implies su±cient capital in steady state is necessary for positive growth.
Thus, the amount of capital is an important key determination of growth rate
and appearance of poverty traps.
Substituting (18) into (17), we obtain the following equation which pro-
vides the knowledge-adjusted per capita capital in steady state:
n+
1
®
¡ 1
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1½+
¾
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1±
~k = ®2´¡®
Ã
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1
½
±
+ ¾~k
!1¡®
: (21)
From both sides of (21), we de¯ne the following equation.
L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) ´ n+
1
®
¡ 1
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1½+
¾
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1±
~k(= L(~k))
R(~k;®; ±; ´; ½; ¾) ´ ®2´¡®
Ã
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1
½
±
+ ¾~k
!1¡®
(= R(~k)):
L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) is an increasing line and R(~k;®; ´; ±; ½; ¾) is a decreasing
curve with lim~k!1R(~k) = 0 and lim~k!0R(~k) =1. These two equations are
drawn in Fig.1.
The properties of steady growth path in decentralized economy requires
the following equation.
~k¤ = arg
©
~k j L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) = R(~k;®; ´; ±; ½; ¾)ª; (22)
where ~k¤ is the knowledge-adjusted per capita capital stock in steady growth
path. Totally di®erentiating the both sides of (22) with respect to ~k and
Â(2 f®; ±; ´; ½; n; ¾g) yields the following derivative:
d~k
dÂ
= ¡
@L
@Â
¡ @R
@Â
@L
@~k
¡ @R
@~k
: (23)
Di®erentiating L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) andRD(~k;®; ´; ±; ½; ¾) with respect to ~k; ±; ´; n
and ½, we obtain the following results; L~k > 0, L± > 0, L´ = 0, L½ > 0,
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Ln > 0, R~k < 0, R± > 0, R´ < 0, R½ < 0, and Rn = 0. These derivatives
yield the followings:
d~k¤
d´
< 0;
d~k¤
d½
< 0; and
d~k¤
dn
< 0: (24)
The sign of d
~k¤
d±
is ambiguous. These results insist that lower cost of intermedi-
ate goods, lower subjective discount rate and lower population growth rate is
necessary for larger knowledge-adjusted per capita capital stock. d~k¤Dd½ < 0
and (19) show that population growth is negatively related on economic
growth. It is the opposite properties which is presented by semi-endogenous
growth models with labor R&D inputs.
From (20), the condition of positive growth is given as
~k¤ > ~k: (25)
Because L(~k) and RD(~k) are monotonous increasing and decreasing function,
respectively, the condition (25) is equivalent to
L(~k) < R(~k): (26)
Substituting ~k into L(~k) and R(~k), we now study the condition required in
RSS, which is characterized as g¤ > 0.
Parameter Condition of an RSS: n+ ½ < ­(½;®; ´; ±); (27)
where ­ ´ ®1+®´¡®
³
±(1¡®)
½
´1¡®
. Small n, small ½ and large ± realize this
case.
3.2 The property of the Solow Steady State (SSS)
Secondly, we derive the steady state capital stock in the SSS. In the SSS, since
(16) holds with inequality, all capital is devoted to ¯nal goods production;
therefore, ~k¤¤A = 0, namely, ~k
¤¤ = ~k¤¤Y where ¤¤ denotes the steady state value
in SSS. Eq. (4) and gA = 0 imply that the growth rate in this case is given
as gK = gY = gC ´ g¤¤ = n. Substituting gC = n, therefore gc = 0 into
Eq. (11) yields r = ½ + n. Eq. (5) results in r = ®2´¡®~k®¡1 + n, and Eq.
(11) and gc = 0 yield r ¡ ½¡ n = 0. From these two equations, equilibrium
capital stock in SSS is given as follows.
No Growth Equilibrium: ~k¤¤ = ~k¤¤Y =
·
®2´¡®
½+ n
¸ 1
1¡®
: (28)
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Eq. (28) implies that when ½ and ´ are large, they bear a small amount of
equilibrium capital stock. From the second and third terms of (16) and Eq.
(28), we have the following inequality which must hold in SSS:
®2´¡®
·
®2´¡®
½+ n
¸¡1
> ±
1¡ ®
®
·
®2´¡®
½+ n
¸ 1
1¡®
+ n:
Solving this inequality, we can obtain the condition for the SSS as
Parameter Condition of an SSS: ½+ n > ­(½;®; ´; ±): (29)
Large n and ½ and small ± cause this case.
3.3 The Determination of Steady State
The conditions of Eq. (27) and those of Eq. (29) are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, the determination of the steady state is summarized in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 1: An economy has a unique long-run steady state of growth
or poverty traps that is determined by the following condition:
½+ n
(
<
>
)
­(½;®; ´; ±),
(
RSS
SSS
This condition shows that the parameter set f®; ´; ½; ±g uniquely determines
either steady state. Thus, deep parameters determine the growth rate in the
long-run.
The relationship is drawn in Figure 2. n+ ½ is a liner increasing function
and ­ is a monotonously decreasing function and lim½!0­(½) = 1, both
lines have only one solution written as ½. This ½ determines the upper bound
of the subjective discount rate ½ for steady growth. If ½ is smaller than ½,
the economy has the steady state with a steady growth, and if ½ is larger,
the economy has a poverty traps. The increase of population growth rate
n shifts n + ½ upper and ­ is invariant for the change of n, therefore, the
increase of n declines the value of ½ From the de¯nition of ­, ­´ < 0, and
­± > 0, an increase of ´ and a decrease of ± declines the value of ½.
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4 Transition Dynamics and Steady States
4.1 Local Transition dynamics
A decentralized economic system comprises Eqs.(4), (6), (7), (11), and (14).
The system is reconstructed into the system constituted by ~k, ~C and ~kY .
Substituting ~Y and r given in Eq. (14) into Eq. (4), we obtain:
_~k(t) = ´¡®~kY (t)® ¡ ~c(t)¡ ±(~k(t)¡ ~kY (t))~k(t): (30)
Substituting g~c + gA = gc and r = ®
2´¡®~k®¡1Y in Eq. (11), we obtain the
dynamics of ~c as follows:
_~c(t) =
1
¾
©
®2´¡®~kY (t)®¡1 ¡ ½¡ n¡ ¾±(~k(t)¡ ~kY (t))
ª
~c(t): (31)
Regarding the dynamics of ~kY , each regime follows di®erent synamics de-
scribed below.
4.1.1 Dynamics of the economy in the Romer Regime
Then, uniting gv = r¡ ±¼rL (from the arbitrage condition require (7) and free
entry into R&D (6) and gr = gv ¡ n (from the free entry into R&D (6)),
and eliminating gv from them, we obtain gr + n = r ¡ ±¼rL . r = ®2´¡®~k®¡1Y
derives gr = (® ¡ 1)g~kY and ±¼=(rL) = ±(1¡ ®)~kY =®. Substitution of these
equations into gr + n = r ¡ ±¼rL yields the dynamics of ~kY as
_~kY (t) =
±
®
~kY (t)
2 +
n
1¡ ®
~kY (t)¡ ®
2´¡®
1¡ ®
~kY (t)
®: (32)
Because the dynamics of ~kY guided by Eq. (32) is the function that contains
only ~kA as a variable, the dynamic properties of ~kY are immediately obtained
from Eq. (32). The dynamics of ~kY are easily found to be unstable; the phase
diagram of ~kY is given in Figure 3. Therefore, for the realization of RSS, it
is necessary that ~kY (t) = ~k
¤
Y must be satis¯ed in, at least, the neighborhood
of the steady state. If ~kY (t) < ~k
¤
Y ,
~kY (t) decreases following the dynamics of
Eq. (32).
Lemma 1 On the transition path converging to RSS, ~kY must be constant
at ~k¤Y in the neighborhood of RSS.
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Thus, the dynamical system in the Romer regime must ride on the plain
~kY (t) = ~k
¤
Y , that we term the "Romer regime manifold." Consequently, the
system is reduced into the two-dimensional system comprising ~k and ~C. Be-
cause the system displays properties similar to the dynamic property of the
Ramsey model, it is easily veri¯ed that this system has saddle stability.
4.1.2 Dynamics of the economy in the Solow Regime
In this regime, ~kA = 0 leads to ~k(t) = ~kY (t). Thus, the Solow regime also
exists on the two-dimensional plane, which we call the Solow regime manifold.
Under this condition, the system comprising (30) and (31) is made into
_~k(t) = ´¡®~k(t)® ¡ ~c(t)¡ n~k(t); (33)
_~c(t) =
1
¾
©
®2´¡®~k(t)®¡1 ¡ ½¡ nª~c(t): (34)
Thus, the dynamical system in this case is similar to that of the normal
Solow model; one di®erence is the interest rate. Because an ¶a la Romer
type of R&D-based growth model contains distortional intermediate goods
pricing and our model assumes that intermediate goods are made by capital,
interest rate (equivalently capital rental price) is ® times smaller than the
normal Solow model.
4.2 Global Transitional Dynamics and Steady States
Uniting the local transition dynamics discussed in the previous section, we
derive the global dynamics in this section. Depending on the two types of
steady state, RSS and SSS, we will obtain the two growth patterns.
From Proposition 1, if an economy has RSS (namely, ½ + n < ­), then
RSS is the economy's unique steady state. In this case, Eq. (32), and
consequently ~kY = ~k
¤
Y , must hold in the steady state and the neighborhood.
From Section 4.1.1, we observe that the system is saddle stable on ~k ¡ ~c
plane. The phase diagram of this regime is drawn on the dotted region in
Figure 4. If initial knowledge-adjusted capital stock ~k(0) is larger than ~k¤Y ,
~kY remains at ~k
¤
Y and the system comprising f~k; ~cg converges into RSS. If
~k(0) is smaller than ~k¤Y , then resource constraint induces the R&D activity
to ride on the Romer regime manifold, such that the economy rides on the
Solow regime manifold and grows through capital accumulation. The Solow
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regime is drawn on the shaded region in Figure 4. After su±cient knowledge-
adjusted capital stock is accumulated, the economy begins R&D activities;
thus, the economy experiences a regime switch from the Solow regime to the
Romer regime.
On the other hand, if an economy has SSS (namely, ½ > ­), Proposition 1
implies that SSS is the economy's unique steady state. In this case, even if a
plentiful initial capital or knowledge stock exists in the economy, the economy
fails to execute R&D. This mechanism is as follows. Because steady state
knowledge-adjusted capital stock is smaller than the capital stock that e®ects
a balance between goods production and R&D, Eq. (32){that is derived from
the arbitrage condition between capital and the R&D ¯rm{cannot hold after
a ¯nite period in the future. This expectation leads rational agent to refrain
from investing in R&D activity. Thus, this economy grows without R&D,
and falls into SSS. This is the mechanism of the no-growth trap in this study.
Some medium developed countries demonstrate failure to transit long-term
positive growth in the polarization process; the mechanism presented here
may be the cause of this phenomenon. The phase diagram of this economy
is depicted in Figure 5.
Proposition 2 An economy has a unique steady state and a perfect fore-
sight saddle-stable transition path that is convergent with the steady state.
The long-run growth phase, showing either steady growth or poverty traps,
is determined uniquely according to technological parameters (®; ´ and ±)
and preference parameter (½). The economy with RSS (and low initial capi-
tal endowment) experiences a regime switch from capital-accumulation-based
growth to R&D-based growth and realizes long-run growth. The economy with
SSS lacks the pro¯tability for R&D investment and persistently stays in Solow
regime and is thus caught in poverty traps.
5 Optimal Growth and Economic Policy
The previous section shows the results of the present model with regard to
decentralized economic growth. Following the perfect foresight path deter-
mined by given parameters, an economy is convergent to steady state with
long-run growth or no growth. However, the present model contains a distor-
tion in the intermediate goods pricing and a bad equilibrium termed as SSS.
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This section examines the possible roles of the government through economic
policies on economic welfare and development.
5.1 Command Economy
To obtain the welfare properties of a decentralized solution, consider the
social planner formulation of this growth model. A benevolent government
is assumed to maximize the representative household's utility function Eq.
(9). Therefore, a Hamiltonian of the government is written as
H = c
1¡¾ ¡ 1
1¡ ¾ + ¸(´
¡®k®YA
1¡®| {z }
y
¡c¡ nk) + ¹±(k ¡ kY );
where ¸ and ¹ are the shadow prices of per capita capital stock and knowl-
edge, respectively. The optimal conditions are obtained as follows:
¸ = c¡¾; (35)
¸®´¡®k®¡1Y A
1¡® = ¹±; (36)
½¸¡ _¸ = @H
@k
= ¡¹±; (37)
½¹¡ _¹ = @H
@A
= ¹(1¡ ®)´¡®k®YA¡®; (38)
Using Eqs. (35), (37), and (38), we derive the following equations:
½¡ g¸ = ®´¡®k®¡1Y A1¡®; (39)
½¡ g¹ = 1¡ ®
®
±kY
A
; (40)
From Eqs. (35) and (39) and using the de¯nition of ~c and ~k, the following
Euler equation is produced as
g~c =
1
¾
¡
®´¡®~k®¡1Y ¡ ½¡ n¡ ¾±(~k ¡ ~kY )
¢
: (41)
Because Eq. (36) yields g¹ = g¸ + gy ¡ gkY and Eq. (39) is converted into
g¸ = ½¡ ®´¡®~k®¡1Y , g¹ is derived as
g¹ = ½¡ ®´¡®~k®¡1Y + gy ¡ gkY : (42)
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Substituting Eq. (42) into Eq. (40), we obtain the optimal capital allocation
dynamics as follows: ®´¡®~k®¡1Y ¡ gY + gkY = 1¡®® ±~kY . Using ~kY , ~k, and
gY = ®gkY + (1¡ ®)gA, and di®erenciating with Respect with ~kY , we get
g~kY = gkY ¡ gA =
1
1¡ ®
·
±(1¡ ®)
®
~kY ¡ ®´¡®~k®¡1Y
¸
: (43)
The system consists of these three dynamic equations: (4), (41), and (43),
which imply that gKY = gK and gA = gk = gc = ±(k ¡ kY )=A must hold in a
steady state. Rewriting these conditions with ~k, ~y, and ~c, we obtain g~kY = g~k
and gA = gk = gc = ±(~k ¡ ~kY ). Substituting these conditions into Eqs. (4),
(41), and (43), we obtain the following equations depicting the steady state
of the command economy:
½+ ¾±(~k¤op ¡ ~k¤opY ) = ®´¡®~k¤op®¡1Y ¡ n; (44)
´¡®~k¤op®Y ¡ ~c¤op ¡
©
n+ ±(~k¤op ¡ ~k¤opY )
ª
~k¤op = 0 (45)
®´¡®~k¤op®¡1Y ¡ n =
1¡ ®
®
±~k¤opY : (46)
Eliminating ® ~y
u~k
¡ n from (44) and (46), we obtain the following equation:
½+¾±(~k¡ ~kY ) = 1¡®® ±~kY . Solving this equation with respect to u, we obtain
the optimal capital allocation in steady state as
~k¤opY =
½+ ¾±~kop¡
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1¢ ± : (47)
From (14) and (47), the optimal growth rate of economy is given as
g¤op =
1
¾
µ
±
1¡ ®
®
~kY ¡ ½
¶
=
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢ ±~k¤op ¡ ½
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1 : (48)
g¤ insists that a higher subjective discount rate ½, a higher R&D e±ciency
±, a knowledge-adjusted per capita capital stock ~k, and a smaller CRRA
parameter ¾ make the growth rate of economy higher.
Substituting u¤op and g¤op into (44), we obtain the following equation
which provides the knowledge-adjusted per capita capital in steady state:
n+
1
®
¡ 1
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1½+
¾
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1±
~kop = ®´¡®
Ã
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1
½
±
+ ¾~kop
!1¡®
: (49)
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From both sides of (49), we de¯ne the following equation.
L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) ´ n+
1
®
¡ 1
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1½+
¾
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1±
~kop
Rop(~k;®; ±; ´; ½; ¾) ´ ®´¡®
Ã
¾ + 1
®
¡ 1
½
±
+ ¾~kop
!1¡®
(= Rop(~k)):
L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) is the identical of the LHS of Eq.(21) and Rop(~k;®; ´; ±; ½; ¾)
is ® times for RHS of Eq.(21) RD(~k;®; ´; ±; ½; ¾), then, Rop is also drawn
in Fig.1. The properties of steady growth path in the command economy
requires the following equation.
~k¤op = arg
©
~k j L(~k;®; ±; ½; n; ¾) = Rop(~k;®; ´; ±; ½; ¾)ª; (50)
where ~k¤op is the steady-growth knowledge-adjusted per capita capital stock
in command economy. Because the di®erence between decontralized economy
and command economy is that RD is ® times Rop, the properties of steady
state are similar to each other. In steady state of optimal economy, lower ½,
´, and n make a higher growth rate of par capita GDP growth rate. These
are common to the steady state in the decentralized economy. However,
the equilibrium capital stock of command economy is larger than that of
decentralized economy, therefore, the growth rate of this economy is higher
than that of decentralized economy.
This implies su±cient capital is necessary for steady growth. If this con-
dition is lacked, no R&D investment is optimal, then KA = gA = 0, and
the poverty-trap knowledge-adjusted per capita capital stock in command
economy ~k¤¤op is given as
~k¤¤op =
·
®´¡®
n+ ½
¸ 1
1¡®
: (51)
From (47) and (48), the condition of feasible positive growth g¤(~kop) > 0
is given as
~kop > ~k: (52)
Because L(~k) and Rop(~k) are monotonous increasing and decreasing function,
respectively, the condition (52) is equivalent to
L(~k) < Rop(~k): (53)
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Substituting ~k into L(~k) and R(~k), we obtain the following inequality:
n+ ½ < ­op(½;®; ´; ±); (54)
where ­op ´ ®®´¡®
³
±(1¡®)
½
´1¡® ¡
= 1
®
­(½)
¢
. Small n, small ½ and large ±
realize this case. Uniting (50) and (51), we obtain the equilibrium capital
stock in command economy ~kop as follows:
Proposition 1': An economy has a unique optimal long-run steady state
of positive growth or no growth traps that is determined by the following
condition:
~kop =
(
~k¤op if n+ ½ < ­op
~k¤¤op if n+ ½ > ­op
)
) Long-run optimal growth is
(
positive growth (RSS)
no growth (SSS)
; (55)
where ­op ´ ®®´¡®
³
±(1¡®)
½
´1¡® ¡
= 1
®
­(½)
¢
. A small ½ and n and large ±
realize this case.
5.2 E®ects of Economic Policies
Here, taxes and subsidies are introduced into our model. It is proposed that
a constant rate subsidy s > 0 (a tax if s < 0) is levied (provided) for interest
(rental price of capital) and the pro¯t of the intermediate sector, as below
rs ´ (1 + sr)r = (1 + sr)®2 Y
KY
;
¼s ´ (1 + s¼)¼ = (1 + s¼)®(1¡ ®)Y
A
;
where sr and s¼ represent the interest and a pro¯t subsidies rate, respectively.
The existence of distortion in the intermediate goods market leads the de-
centralized economy to accumulate less knowledge-adjusted stock of capital
than the command economy. For this reason, an economic policy to pro-
mote capital accumulation by subsidizing the interest rate always improves
economic welfare.
The government is assumed to ¯nance these subsidies using lump-sum
tax revenues. The total tax revenue is expressed as TLS. We assume that
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the government maintains a balanced ¯nancial policy: the budget constraint
srK + s¼A = T
LS is always satis¯ed. Translating r and ¼ in Eqs. (31) and
(32) to rs and ¼s, we determine both lines after taxation (or subsidy) as
follows.
_~c =
1
¾
©
(1 + sr)®
2´¡®~k®¡1Y ¡ ½¡ n¡ ¾±(~k ¡ ~kY )
ª
~c; (56)
_~kY =
±
®
(1 + s¼)~k
2
Y +
n
1¡ ®
~kY ¡ (1 + sr)®
2´¡®
1¡ ®
~k®Y : (57)
For optimal growth, Eqs. (56) and (57) must correspond with Eqs. (41) and
(43) (in Appendix), respectively.
Lemma 2: Optimal growth rate and capital allocation are realized by the
following subsidy policies:
s¤r =
1
®
¡ 1 > 0; s¤¼ = 0:
Because ® 2 (0; 1), s¤r is always constant and negative, implying that this
e®ective policy is perennial and that it increases the welfare of the economy.
5.3 Economic Policy for "Take-o®"
The previous section showed that an economic policy of interest-rate subsi-
dies can increase the welfare of the economy by equalizing a decentralized
economy to the Pareto-e±cient economy derived in Section 5.1. On the one
hand, can an optimal subsidy policy thrust a country from a poverty trap
into steady growth? The answer, at least partially, is in the a±rmative.
As is derived in Section 5.1, the Pareto-e±cient steady state is given by
~kop, and this value does not always satisfy the condition for positive growth
given by Eq. (55). If ~kop < ~k, the optimal steady state is that of no-
growth. Therefore, the no-growth equilibrium (SSS) is an optimal path for
the country in this case. If the government desires long-run positive growth
in such a case, some parameters must be relevantly promoted; for example,
it is necessary to increase the R&D e±ciency ±.
If the parameter set of a country yields ~kop > ~k, the optimal steady state
of the economy is long-run positive growth (RSS). However, the decentralized
economy of the county will be caught in SSS if the country has, in addition,
a parameter set that causes ~k¤¤D < ~k(< ~kop)(which yields the condition ­ <
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½ < ­op from Proposition 1 and 1'); thus, a no-subsidy policy is executed. In
this case, the country potentially possesses the capability for long-run positive
growth, but monopoly power exercised in the decentralized economy draws
the economy into a no-growth trap. In this situation, the optimal subsidizing
policy for canceling out the monopoly pricing transforms the long-run steady
state from SSS into RSS.
In the case of ~kop < ~k, the economy has no optimal path with a positive
long-run growth, and the economy cannot possibly ride on a steady growth
path without harming the welfare of the country. Therefore, some external
economic aids are necessary for realizing positive long-run growth in this
country. Hence, we demonstrate the e®ects of ODA, which refers to ¯nancial
or technological aid o®ered by developed countries to their underdeveloped
counterparts (i.e., countries with SSS under the optimal policies) for the
purpose of launching the countries on a steady growth path, namely, the
Romer regime.
Generally speaking, the ODA measures of licensing technology and pro-
viding capital stock are regarded as increments of A and K, respectively.
These produce e®ects on the endowment of knowledge-adjusted capital ~k.
However, the equilibrium conditions of neither Proposition 1 nor 1', steady
states of the aided countries remain wholly una®ected. Consequently, the
economy will continue to be on a no-growth path; the economy consumes
capital to converge to SSS. These e®ects can be considered to only jump
to a point on the long-run no-growth path. Therefore, for e®ective ODA,
it is necessary to aid an economy to change the conditions of Proposition
1'. Therefore, the ODA should improve an e±ciency parameter such as the
cost of intermediate goods production ´ or R&D e±ciency ±. To ensure the
long-run growth of an independent economy, it is important that developed
countries not o®er stock of new technology but instead o®er the capability
to create new technology. These parameters might corresponds to infras-
tructure or institutional e±ciency. Thus, above results are summarized as
follows
Proposition 3 Interest-rate subsidy raises the welfare level through an in-
crease in capital stock. The subsidies can increase the long-run growth rate
if an optimal path of the economy is a steady growth path. The subsidy pol-
icy for interest rates enables the country to escape from poverty traps if that
country has an optimal RSS path. For a country with an optimal SSS path,
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ODA that o®ers endowments such as capital stock and knowledge is ine®ec-
tive for the country to ride on an optimal RSS path. If the ODA su±ciently
promotes production e±ciency, for example, the cost of intermediate goods
production ´ and R&D e±ciency ±, will change the long-run steady state of
the economy to RSS.
6 Conclusion
This study developed a model with capital R&D inputs and investigated the
mechanics of capital on economic growth and development. The equilibrium
capital stock is positively related with the long-run growth rate. The capital
stock negatively depends on the cost of intermediate goods and a subjec-
tive discount rate, which determines the steady state of the economy. Each
economy has a unique steady state and a unique transition path converging
to the steady states. To achieve long-run positive growth, the country must
have high R&D e±ciency along with a low cost of intermediate goods, and a
subjective discount rate. If an economy lacks these conditions, the country
stays in the regime without R&D and is caught in a poverty trap.
The model presents a regime switch of the economic growth phase. If a
country with positive long-run growth has a low initial capital endowment,
the economy grows by capital accumulation at the ¯rst stage of economic
development, and then, su±ciently accumulated capital stock enables the
economy to switch to R&D-based growth, therefore, the economy realizes
long-run growth through R&D.
Because the model incorporates a monopoly situation of intermediate
goods production, the economy contains a distortion. For this reason, the
economic policy is e®ective. This distortion appears in the interest rate of the
economy and creates a smaller amount of long-run capital stock. Therefore,
economic policies to subsidize the interest rate and increase the steady-state
capital can ride the economy onto an optimal path; therefore, economic wel-
fare can always be improved by this subsidizing policy. However, this pol-
icy cannot launch a country in a no-growth steady state under the optimal
growth path onto one with long-run growth rate. Some external physical
and knowledge capital aids are also ine®ective for this purpose. E®ective aid
should improve the R&D economic environment, for example, promoting the
e±ciency of intermediate goods production or R&D investment.
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Figure 4: Global Phase Dynamics (Long-run growth case)
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